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This paper makes two contributions to understanding and testing the
effectiveness of central bank interventions. Firstly, the simultaneity
problem between exchange rates and interven[ions is addressed explicitly
by implementing a test procedure proposed by Vella (1993). Secondly,
the direct effect of intervention on the level of the exchange rate is
estimated. Daily observations for Bundesbank and Federal Reserve
interventions are used together with intradaily data for the Deutsche
MarklUS dollar exchange rate. The period under consideration runs from
the Louvre Agreement of February 22, 1987 to October 1989.
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1. Introduction
Since the breakdown of [he Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in
the early seventies, the exchange value of the major currencies in the
industrialized world is in principle determined by market forces.
However, in the present system of managed floating the exchange rate is
not the outcome of supply and demand by private market participants
only. The monetary authorities of many countries have frequen[ly been
trying to influence the relative value of their currencies by exchange
market interventions. To comply wi[h Article IV of the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as amended in
1978 central banks are obliged to promote a stable exchange rate system
and hence to "coun[er disorderly exchange market conditions". It is a
fact of observation that central banks do indeed enter the marke[ for
foreign exchange in case of strains. Estimates of intervention reaction
tunctions confinrt that the authorities do this systematically (Almekinders
and Eijffinger 1994a,b).
After having established that central banks systematically "lean against
the wind" it is straightforward to ask the question whether interventions
are effective. A lot of effort has been devoted to investigating the
effectiveness of central bank intervention (for sutveys of the literature,
see Almekinders and Eijffinger 1991 and Edison 1993). Straightforward
estimation of the effect of interventions on contemporaneous exchange
rate movemen[s only obtains consisten[ estimation resul[s if the
interventions cause contemporaneous exchange rate movements and not
the other way around. Obviously, however, i[ can not be ruled out a
priori that contemporaneous exchange rate movements are one of the
factors which trigger interventions. Some studies disregard this (see, e.g.
Dominguez and Frankel 1993a, p. 115 and p. 127). As a result, the
estimation results reported in these studies are subject to simultaneity
bias. The empirical investigations which do provide consistent estimates
basically measure the perceived spot rate effects of interventions
indirectly through a risk premium (see, e.g. Dominguez and Frankel
1993b). However, the measurement problems for risk premia are well-
established.
This paper reports on the results of an empirical investigation into the
effectiveness of official intervention by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the
US Federal Reserve System in the Deutsche Mark-US dollar spot
exchange market. The paper makes two contributions to understanding
and testing the effectiveness of central bank interventions. Firstly, the
simultaneity problem between exchange rates and interventions is
addressed explicitly by implementing a test procedure proposed by Vella2
(1993). Secondly, the direct effect of intervention on the level of the
exchange rate is estimated. Daily observations for the official
interventions and the exchange rate are used. The period under
consideration runs from the Louvre Agreement of February 22, 1987 to
October 1989.
The paper is organized into five remaining sections. Section 2
develops the framework within which the effectiveness of central bank
interventior. is analysed. Section 3 discusses the simultaneity problem.
Section 4 sets out and implements an estimation procedure proposed by
Vella (1993) to test for simultanei[y in a model with a censored
endogenous regressor. Section 5 reports on the results of an empirical
investigation into the immediate impact of interventions by the Bundes-
bank and the Federal Reserve System on the level of the DMI~-rate by
altering market expectations. Section 6 concludes.
2. Modeling the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention
Under the assumption of highly efficient markets, effective interventions
wil] influence exchange rate movements immedia[ely (that is, within [he
same day) by altering the expectations of market participants. Thus, the
intraday change of the DMI~-exchange rate in Frankfurt can be written
as a function of, inter alia, the volume of intervention carried out by the
Deutsche Bundesbank on day t (INV,DBB):
SFR,in w- SFR,".'o - f(I~oan
X) (1)
where x is a set of unspecified exogenous variables.' SFR,B "' and
SFR,163~ are the opening spot ra[e and the closing spo[ rate of one US
dollar expressed in DM at the Frankfurt exchange, collected at 8.30
hours and 16.30 hours (Frankfurt time), respectively. The exchange
market interventions by the Bundesbank are expressed in millions of
DMs. The interventions are positive if the central bank buys dollars in
return for DMs. The Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve will often
coordinate their intervention efforts. Yet, it seems reasonable to assume
that the Federal Reserve only intervenes when the New York market is
opened. Therefore, the effect of Federal Reserve intervention has to be
measured by its impact on the exchange rate on [he New York market.
Based on the foregoing, the effectiveness of Bundesbank intervention
can be tested by estimating the following equation:
SFR,~~~-SFR,"~ - ao t ai ~~Vynee t a2 (SFR,"~-SFR"~) ~ b~ (2)3
where S, is a residual and ao and a, are coefficients. Equation (2) is a
restricted form of equation (1). It focuses on interventions which reverse
unwanted exchange ra[e movements. This reflects that a narrow
definition of effectiveness of intervention is adopted in this paper.
Consequently, oftïcial exchange market operations which only slow down
unwanted exchange rate movements are not identified as successful
interventions. However, by solving the definitional problem we can not
get away with the familiar methodological problem that the fluctuations
in the exchange rate that would have occurred in the absence of
intervention can not be observed. If the Bundesbank is able to influence
the market sentiment, the exchange ra[e will rise after the news of
official dollar-purchases. Therefore, in that case the intervention
coefficient a, will be positive. The coeftïcient a2 will be significantly
larger than zero for periods in which the èxchange rate experienced a
trend-like appreciation or depreciation.
Analogously, the equation for the effectiveness of Federal Reserve
intervention looks as follows:
(S~,
,16.W-SNY,9W) - b t b INV~. DM~S t b SFR16 W-SFR9,~`~ t S DMIS 0 1 ~ 2( ~ ~ OMIE (3)
where SNY,16W and SNY,yo" are the opening spot ra[e and the closing spot
rate of one US dollar expressed in Deutsche Marks at the New York
exchange, collected at 9.00 hours and 16.00 hours (New York time),
respectively. The exchange market interventions by the Federal Reserve
are expressed in millions of US dollars. The interventions are positive if
the Federa] Reserve buys dollars in return for Deutsche Marks. Again,
the intervention coefficient b~ will be positive in case interventions are
effective. A positive value of 62 indicates trends in the exchange rate.
The Federal Reserve also regularly intervenes in the Japanese
YenIU.S. dollar market. The effectiveness of these interventions can be
inferred from the estimation results of [he following equation:
(S~,ie.eo-SNY,9(q)YenIS - C~ t ci INV.Fen.YertiB , cZ (SFR,16W-SFRv~u)re~is ' b,
(4)
where SNY,'b o" and SNYr9 `~' are the opening spot rate and the closing spot
rate of one US dollar expressed in Japanese Yens at the New York
exchange, collected at 9.00 hours and 16.00 hours (New York time),
respectively. The exchange market interventions by the Federal Reserve
are expressed in millions of US dollars. The interventions are positive if
the Federal Reserve buys dollars in return for Japanese Yens. The inter-4
pretation of the coefficients in equation (4) is the same as in equation (3)
The daily data on interventions of the Bundesbank and the Federal
Reserve in the DMI~-exchange market over the period February 1987 to
October 1989 show that interventions were concentrated in specific
months and thus that periods of intervention were alternated by
(sometimes longer) periods of non-intervention. Moreover, the inter-
ventions in these relatively short periods were one-sided (either purchases
or sales). Thus it may be concluded that neither the Bundesbank
(although intervening more frequently and in larger amounts), nor the
Federal Reserve intervened only to smooth exchange rate movements,
but also tried to influence the exchange rate (or market sentiment) in a
specitïc direction towards an eyuilibrium value (which eventually was
implied by the February 1987 Louvre Agreement of the G-7 countries).
The portfolio balance channel of intervention derives its effect from
creating an imbalance in wealth holders' portfolios. Accordingly,
interventions will have a proportionate effect on the exchange rate which
is constant over time. By contrast, in the case of the expectations channel
much depends on the strength of the market sentiment. Consequently, the
effect of intervention working via this channel will vary over time. To
allow for a time-varying effect of intervention, a number of subsamples
have been selected of at least three months with prolonged interventions
in one direction by either of the central banks.Z
3. The simultaneity problem
In general, when one wants to make inferences about the effectiveness of
foreign exchange market intervention one explicitly has to address the
simultaneity problem. Equations (2), (3) and (4) can be estimated
consistently with ordinary least squares (OLS) only if interventions cause
contemporaneous exchange rate movements and not the other way
around.' Obviously, however, it can not be ruled out a priori that
contemporaneous exchange rate movements are one of the factors which
drive interventions. At the same time, it should be stressed that the
specifíc form of the reduced form equations (2)-(4) for the effectiveness
of intervention reduces the potential simultaneity problem compared to
that in other studies.
Domínguez and Frankel (1993a) try to infer the effectiveness of
Bundesbank and Federal Reserve intervention. They estimate with OLS
an equation in which the dependent variable is the 24-hour DM~~-return.
Baillie and Humpage (1992) estimate a GARCH model in which the
dependent variable also is the 24-hour DMI~-return. Their model looks
as follows:5
100 (0 log SNY,,~ `~,) - an f a~ I1W,Dae . FED } r (Sa)
e, ~ S2,-, - N(0, h,) (Sb)
{2, - 7f t RZ IPURDe6
. FED ~
R; ISALDBB
. FED }~ Er-' }~ h` , (Se)
with a, a, ~3 ) 0, a f a G 1. SNY,"' `p denotes the closing rate of the US
dollar in Deutsche Marks in New York on day t. Equation {Sa)
represents the mean equation of the model. The dependent variable is the
DM~~-return during a global, 24-hour trading day; from the closing of
the New York foreign exchange market on day t-1 until the closing on
day t. INV,DBBtFED is the sum of the volume of US dollar interventions
carried out by the Deutsche Bundesbank and by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, acting on behalf of the Federal Reserve System,
respectively. The interventions are positive if the central bank buys
dollars in return for deutsche marks. Thus, interventions are effective if
a~ J 0 implying that purchases (sales) of US dollars by the central
bank(s) led to a higher (lower) exchange value of the US dollar in terms
of deutsche marks. e, is the residual of the mean equation. Equation (Sb)
states that this residual has a conditional normal distribution with mean
zero and variance h,. 1Z,-, indicates the information available to exchange
market participants as of the beginning of the relevant interval for which
the DMI~-return is calculated, i.e. the closing of the New York foreign
exchange on day t-1. Equation (Sc) deiines the variance equation (h,).
According to Baillie and Humpage official purchases of US dollars
(IPUR, 1 0) are effective if they lower the volatility of daily DM~~-
returns. Hence, az should be negative. Analogously, official sales of US
dollars (ISAL, c 0) are eff~ctive if a, is positive.
It is well-known that the GARCH model can take account of the
persistence in the effects of shocks in period t onto the conditional
variance in later periods. Baillie and Humpage (1992) tïnd the GARCH
parameters (~r, a, J3) to be statistically significant. They implement
appropriate econometric techniques to obtain unbiased and consistent
estimation results in spite of the fact that interventions and exchange rates
are jointly determined. There is one serious problem that remains. The
exchange ra[e return, which is [he dependent variable in their model, is
calculated from the closing of the New York exchange on day t-1
onwards. However, day t's interventions (those carried out by the
Federal Reserve in particular) are mostly carried out in the United States
segment of the global foreign exchange market, after the opening of the
New York exchange market, i.e. during the last 8 hours of the 24-hour
period for which the exchange rate return is calculated. Consequently,6
the period for which the DMI~-re[urn is calculated does not exactly
match the period during which the central banks carry out their
interventions. Therefore, it is not strange that Baillie and Humpage find
statistically significant but systematically wrotigly sigued coeffients for
the intervention variables in both the conditional mean equations and the
conditional variance equations. Perhaps a reasonable interpretation of
Baillie and Humpage's estimation results is that central bank interventi-
ons have reacted to earGer exchange rate developments rather than
caused them. This suggests that the exchange rate equation embodied in
the GARCH model is a degenerated intervention reaction function.
Indeed, when the estimated coefficients are viewed as coming from an
intervention reaction function they are almost all statistically significant
with the correct sign.
Dominguez (1993) tries to infer the effectiveness of Bundesbank,
Federal Reserve and Bank of Japan interventions from a similar GARCH
model. She does not use matching exchange rate and intervention data
either. Therefore, she also finds wrongly signed coefficients for the
effect of intervention on the level of the exchange rate.
Using [he intervention reaction function developed in Almekinders
and Eijffinger (1994a,b) the relevant simultaneous equation model is
given by
S,~ - S,P - IX~ t at INVr t c~Z (S,U~ - S,P~) t e~ (6)
INV,~ - a0 t a, (S,P
- SM") } ~2 (Sr"
- S~P) f ~(,' (7)
where e, and ~,' are identically and independently distributed random
variables with mean zero and constant variance aF- and a~,z,
respectively.' S,P and S~" are day t's opening (primo) and closing
(ultimo) rate, respectively, on the Frankfurt or the New York foreign
exchange market depending on whether the regression is concerned with
the effectiveness of Bundesbank or Federal Reserve intervention.
Equation (7) is an intervention reaction function. Accordingly, the central
bank `leans against the wind' and acts upon increases in the conditional
variance of the exchange rate. S,M" is a moving average of exchange rate
quotations during the trading hours of the relevant foreign exchange
market on previous days. When day t's opening spot exchange rate is
above (below) the moving average of the exchange rate on previous
trading days the central bank is expected to carry out sales (purchases) of
domestic currency. Consequently, the coefficient a, is expected to be
negative. The term (S,P - S,M") is derived from values of the relevant
exchange rate which were known (by the central bank) at the time day t'sinterventions were carried out. This is not the case with the term (S,u -
S:~ in eyuation (7).s It follows that in this equation allowance is made
for contemporaneous exchange rate movements causing current
interventions.
lNV, and lNV,~ are observed and `desired' intervention, respectively.
On the majority of trading days in the sample (677 in the Frankfur[
market and 673 in the New York market, respectively) the volume of
intervention hy either of the central banks is eyual to zero. A possible
explanation for the large number of zero interventions is that the central
bank does not carry out foreign exchange market operations intended to
alter the course of the exchange rate until the perceived necessi[y to step
in the market exceeds a certain threshold level. This necessity can not be
observed, however. This is also the case with 'negative' interventions
which correspond to various levels of necessity below the threshold
level.~ The relationship between observed and necessary intervention
applying to both buying and selling offoreign exchange is
lNV, - INV,' if INV,' 1 0 (8)
- 0 if lNV,' ~ 0
Interventions are effective if purchases (sales) of US dollars by the
Bundesbank or the Federal Reserve lead to a rise in the value of the US
dollar expressed in Deutsche Marks or Japanese yens, i.e. if the
estimated value of the coefficient a, in eyuation (6) is significantly larger
than zero. However, if (3Z ~ p, lNV,' is endogenous and [hus lNV, can
not be treated as an exogenous variable in (6). Estimation of (6) with
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) will not be consisten[. One solution to this
problem is full Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation of the model made
up of equations (6) and (7).' This is computationally not very attractive,
particularly while only a test for endogeneity is required. In the next
section a test procedure is implemented to address [he simultaneity
problem between exchange rates and interven[ion. It will turn out that the
results of implementing the test procedure do not give rise to rejection of
the null hypothesis H,,: (3z - 0, i.e. the hypothesis of no endogeneity in
the volume of daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve intervention.
Therefore, Section 5 proceeds by assuming that equation (6) and hence
eyuations (2)-(4) can be es[imated consistently with OLS.
4. Testing for simultaneity between exchange rates and intervention
In this section the test procedure proposed by Vella (1993) is
implemented to address the simultaneity problem between exchange rates8
and intervention. The test procedure involves taking conditional
expec[ations in (6); conditioning on bo[h predetermined variables
((S,P - S,MA), (S,~, - S,P,)) and INV,. This gives
U P P MA U P
E(S, - S, ) ~ (S, - S, ), (S,-, - S,-,), 1NVr - ao t ai INV, t
f IXz (S,Ui - S,P,) f E(E, I (SrP -.SMA). (Sr 1- SPI), ÍNV,) (9)
On the assumption that e, exhibits no autocorrelation (which holds in
general for short-term exchange rate returns, see Hsieh 1989) and that
(S,P - S,MA) is correctly excluded from (6), the conditional expectation
on the right hand side of (9) is nonzero only if INV, is endogenous.
To test this, it is convenient to have a reduced form for (7) in which
INV, (lNV,') is explained by (SP - SM`') and (S,"~ - SP~) only.
Substitution of (6) in (7) obtains
lNV,` - a~ t~1 (S,P
- S;"n) } a
zao t (jza, INV, t
t aZaz (sr", - S,p~) t cazE~ } 1~~) (lo)
or
INV,' - z,'~y f yz INV, t v, ( l0)'
where z,' - [1 (S,P - SMA)
(Sri - S,P,)~, tiz -~~z ai~ and v, - Qz E~ }
~,. Starting from the assumption that e, and ~, are independent, the error
term v, in ( 10)' will be correlated with the error term e, in (6) only if az
~ 0 (endogeneity). Rewriting ( 10)', obtains
INV~~ - yz ~~~ - z,'ry f v, (10)„
thus
INV,' - z,' y t v~
1 -yz 1 -ryz
if INV,` ) 0
INV; - z,' y f v, if INV,' S 0
Coherency is guaranteed if 1- yz ~ 0 or yz C 1. For computational
ease, we define a new latent variable INV," such that
INV," - INV,` - INV, if INV; ) 0
INV,.. - INV,` ~(1 - 1'z) if INV,` S 09
We then have
INV," - z,' y' {- v,` where INV, - INV," if INV," ~ 0 (11)
- 0 otherwise
with y' - y~(1 - yz) and v,' - v,l(1 - yz). Equation (11) can be
esiitnated with standard Tobit IV1L procedures. Estimation results are
reported in Table 1. This provides the reduced form estimates for y` and
z Q,..




ylx t y2 (SrP
- SMA) ~
y} (SrUI - StPI)
Period y,' yZ ry~' Log L obs
Bundesbank intervention in the DMIá-market
87(2)-88(4) -525.45 -234.21 -76.17 -295.53 297
(-5.85) (-5.36) (-0.82)
88(5)-89(10) 204.34 -86.19 -50.18 -984.49 380
(-6.59) (-3.88) (-0.90)
Federal Reserve intervention in DMlB-market
87(2)-88(4) -337.59 - 137.11 -76.20 -262.22 300
(-5.82) (-4.89) (-1.31)
88(5)-89(10) 154.75 -57.33 -25.71 -829.07 373
(6.46) (-3.89) (-0.80)
Federal Reserve intervention in YenIS-market
87(2)-88(1) -302.42 -126.79 -85.10 -364.37 236
(-6.09) (-5.45) (-1.57)
89(1)-89(10) 130.02 -43.20 22.55 -510.87 207
(4.41) (-2.90) (0.60)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses10
Now, return [o equation (9). Assuming joint normality of e, and v,` (or
v,), with covariance at ,, i[ holds [hat
E~Er ~ (Sr - SMA), (SrUi - SrP~). lNV,) - at,,. E(v,' ~ INV,, Z,l
where a. - 0 ea (32 - 0. Apart from Q, this term can be estimated
consistently after replacing the unknown párameters in E(e; ~ INV„ z,)
by their estimates from (11}. The resuiting estimate is known as the
generalized residual in (11).8 It can be shown that




if INV," 1 0
if INV," ~ 0
where ,p(.) and ~(-) are the standard normal density func[ion and
cumulative density function (distribution function), respectively. Finally,
we rewrite (9) as
(S,~ - S,P) - ao t a~ INV, t cxz (S,~~ - S,Pi) t
t vE~. E(v,' ~ INV, , z,~ t e, (12)
where, by construction, e,' is orthogonal with each of the explanatory
variables. After replacing the unknown parame[ers in E (v,' ~]Ny,, zr) by
their estimates, ( 12) can be estimated by OLS. This provides a consistent
estimator for a .. An asymptotically valid test for Ho: a.- 0(a: - E~ .~
0) is the usual t-test.
The results of estimating equation (12) are depicted in Table 2. The
null hypothesis Hn: a .- 0, which is equivalent to the null hypothesis
of no endogeneity in~the volume of daily Bundesbank and Federal
Reserve intervention, ~3z - 0, is not rejected in any of the eleven
regressions. Therefore, this study proceeds by assuming that equation (6)
and hence equations (2)-(4) can be estimated consistently with OLS.
5. Estimating the effect of intervention on the level of the DM~~-rate
The results of the [est procedure implemented in the previous section
indicate thatthe volume ofintervention can be regarded as an exogenous
variable in equation (6). Therefore, equations (2)-(4) can be estimated
consistently wi[h OLS. This provides us with a direct [est of the effect of
intervention on the level of the exchange rate. Estimation results are
shown in Table 3. The first four regression results refer to the11
Table 2 Testing for endogeneity of Bundesbank and Federcrl Reserve
interventions,, OLS estimution results.
StU - SP - a~i t cx, INV~ t IXz (S~ ~- S~P,) t 0~~,. E(V~~ IÍ~~, ~~l
Period ~~; a~ ai o~~' R~ DW obs
Bundesbank intervention in the DMlB-market
87(2)- Q045 -64.0 0.031 0.00016 0.017 1.99 297
88(4) (L87) (-2.50) (0.49) (1.13)
88(5)- 0.039 14.0 0.030 7.53 -.003 2.00 380
89(10) (1.63) (1.04) (0.56) (0.89)
Federal Reserve intervention iu the DMIá-market
87(2)- O.Ol3 - 120.0 -0.090 0.00040 0.026 1.91 300
88(4) (0.58) (-2.97) (-L52) (0.75)
88(5)- -0.026 -5.4 -0.058 -37.0 0.005 1.98 373
89(10) (-0.60) (-0.08) (-1.09) (-0.72)
Federal Reserve intervention in the Yen~á-market
87(2)- 0.0025 -48.0 -0.107 -0.015 0.004 2.00 236
88(l) (0.08) (-1.38) (-L53) (-0.87)
89(1)- 0.020 1(6.0 0.031 -4.04 0.007 2.03 207
89(10) (0.29) (1.33) (0.43) (-0.53)
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. R z is the squared multiple correlation
coefficient adjusted for degrees of freedom. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic for
first-order autocorrela[ion. Obs. gives the number of observations for each period.
The coefticient on INV, (a,) and its corresponding standard error are multiplied by
100000 for readabilit~ .
effectiveness of Bundesbank interventions in the Deutsche MarklUS
dollar exchange market. The dependent variable in the first four
regressions is the intradaily percentage change in the DMI~-rate in the
Frankfurt market. During the first regression period the Bundesbank
carried out purchases of US dollars. The three other periods were
eharacterized by sales of US dollars. The constant (cx„) is positive in all12
four subsamples, though not significant. This ret7ects an appreciation of
the US dollar vis-à-vis the Deutsche Mark in the Frankfurt market.
However, during the first subsample, the US dollar lost ground overall.
Probably, the major part of the overall dollar-depreciation in the months
Table 3 The effect of Bundeshank and Federal Reserve inierventions or.
the level of the DM~.~-rate and the Y~.~-rate; OLS estimation
results
]00 (s,~~ - s,~) - ao t a~ INV, t~z (100 (s~u, - sr`,))
Period aa ~, a2 ~ DW obs
Bundesbank intervention in the DM~~-market
87(9)-88(1) 0.073 -73.0 0.038 0.018 1.98 105
(1.38) (-1.86) (0.38)
88(6)-88(9) 0.102 10.9 -0.055 -0.016 L97 86
( I.72) (0.56) (-0.50)
88(12)-89(3) 0.060 33.0 0.043 -0.017 1.99 84
(1.40) (0.79) (0.37)
89(8)-89(]0) 0.073 96.0 -0.104 0.008 2.05 66
( L 13) (1.30) (-0.84)
Federal Reserve intervention in the UM~B-rnarket
87(10)-88(1) -0.041 -15.0 -0.086 -0.018 2.00 8l
(-0.70) (-0.20) (-0.75)
88(6)-88(9) 0.(115 -80.0 -0.103 0.013 1.9fi 86
(0.27) (-1.73) (-0.89)
89(1)-89(6) 0.00075 -24.0 -0.158 0.011 1.96 125
(0.01) (-0.54) (-1.77)
89(8)-89((0) 0.0024 -62.0 0.095 -0.016 1.97 62
(0.03) (-0.54) (0.72)13
(7crble 3 continued)
100 (s,~ - S,~) - ctio t~~ ~NV~ t a, (l00 (s,u - s,Pi))
Period ~~ a~ a: R' DW obs
Federal Rescïvc intervention in ihe 1'eni~-ntarket
87(3)-87(5) -0.0043 -45.7 -O.1619 0.005 1.97 64
(-0.06) (-1.05) (-1.27)
87(10)-88(1) 0.0034 -54.4 -0.098 -0.009 1.98 L02
(0.07) (-0.51) (-0.98)
89(4)-89(10) Q034 66.3 0.048 0.005 2.03 146
(0.59) (1.56j (0.58)
Notes: see Table 2
the stockmarket crash of October 1987 took place during the non-
European segment of the DMI~-exchange market (that is, while the
Frankfurt exchange was closed). The negative value of the constant in
the first regression for Federal Reserve intervention lends some support
to this. The dependent variable in the first four regressions for Federal
Reserve intervention is the intradaily percentage change in the DMi~-rate
in the New York market. Now compare the values of the constant in the
regressions for the three periods which were characterized by sales of US
dollars. It appears that the waves of dollar-appreciation these periods
have in common were mainly concentrated in the European segment of'
the foreign exchange market. This is the segmen[ during which most
German `news' is released (e.g. monetary policy announcements made
after the bi-weekly meetings of the Central Bank Council of the
Bundesbank). The estimation results suggest that the rise in the DMi~-
rate during these periods is a result of weakness of the Deutsche Mark
rather than strength of the US dollar. More importantly, the estimation
results in Table 3 indicate that the interventions conducted by the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve on the whole did not systematically
affect the level of the DMI~-rate across the four subsamples. The
coefficient for Bundesbank intervention (a,) in the fourth sample is
correctly signed and significant at a mere 20q-level in a two-sided test.
It suggests that during the period August 1989-October 1989 a sale of US14
dollars worth DM 100 million on average led to a lowering of the DM~~-
rate by 0.096qo .
The three regressions at the bottom of Table 3 refer to the
effectiveness of Federal Reserve interventions in the Japanese yenlUS
dollar exchange market. The dependent variable in these regressions is
the intradaily percentage change in the yenl~-rate in the Nesv York
market. During the first and second regression period the Federal
Res:,rve carried out purchases of US dollars. Th:, third pericd is
characterized by sales of US dollars. The estimation result suggest that
sales of LJS dollars carried out by the Federal Reserve during the period
April 1989-October 1989 on average led [o a fall in the value of the US
dollar Vfs-à-vis the Japanese yen. The coefficient for Federal Reserve
intervention in the bottom row is correctly signed and significant at a
12qo-level in a two-sided test. It implies that during the period April
1989-October 1989 a sale of US~ 100 million against Japanese yens on
average led to a lowering of the yen~~-rate by 0.066qo.
We also carried out an event study of the effectiveness of daily
Bundesbank and Federal Reserve interventions. Under the assumption
tha[ the relevant opening spot rate (S,~ incorporates all information
available a[ the time of collec[ion and [hat interventions are
unpredictable, the event study takes the form of estimating equations (2)-
(4) with the zero-interven[ion observations left out of the samples. The
following result was found for Bundesbank in[ervention during the fourth
period, from Augus[ 1989 [o October 1989:
100 Qog SFR,'~'o - log SFRft"') - 0.422 ~- 0.00235 t~rVuea
(2.42) (2.41)
R~ - 0.2430 DW - 1.556 Obs. - l6
As before, t-statistics are in parentheses. During the period considered
sales of US dollars conducted by the Bundesbank were accompanied by,
and perhaps even caused, a major shift of the market sentiment in favour
of a stronger Deutsche Mark. A similar regression on all non-zero
intervention observations over the whole sample period, from September
1987 to October 1989, does not obtain a correctly signed and signitïcant
intervention coefficient for either of the central banks. This confirms that
there is no time-invariant one-to-one relationship with interventions
causing exchange rate movements; much seems to depend on the strength
of the market sentiment and [he ability of central bankers to `read' i[.15
6. Conclusions
It is a fact of observation that ceniral banks enter the foreign exchange
market in case of prolonged exchange rate movements in one direc[ion.
This paper makes two contributions [o understanding and testing the
effectiveness of central bank interventions. Firstly, this study contains an
in-depth analysis of the simultaneity problem between intradaily exchange
rates and daily interventions. A test procedure proposed by Vella (1993)
is implemented to determine that in the reduced forms estimated in this
paper daily interven[ions can be treated as an exogenous variable.
Secondly, the direct effect of intervention on the level of the exchange
rate is estimated.
The estimation results presented in this paper cover the post-Louvre
period February 23, 1987 to October 31, 1989. They indicate that, in
general, interventions conducted by the Bundesbank and the Federal
Reserve System were not successful at systematically reversing unwanted
movements in the DM~~- and the ;1~~-exchange rate. This contradicts the
tindings of Dominguez and Frankel ( 1993a,b). However, the estimation
results in the latter s[udies are subject to simultaneity bias andlor involve
testing the effectiveness of interventions indirectly through a risk
premium.
Of course, the conclusion regarding the general ineffectiveness of
intervention does not rule out that private exchange market participants
may sometimes be caught off balance by the news of central banks
entering the market. What it does imply is that there is no time-invariant
one-to-one relationship with interventions causing exchange rate
movements. This is conform the intuition of many private exchange
market participants and central bankers who manage the Foreign
Exchange Trading Desk.9
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Notes
1. I[ is commonly assumed that imraday exchange rate movements are caused
primarily by short-term capital flows. In an efficient market investors balance
their portfolios at every moment. A change in the interest rate differential will
lead to imbalances. This immediately induces an adjustment process in the
highly efficient money and foreign exchange markets. A relative rise in the DM
interest rate will bring about a demand surplus for financial assets denominated
in DM. Given the supply of DM assets in thc short run, por[folio equilibrium
will be restored by a fall in the exchange value of one U.S. dollar in DM.
Unfortunately, intradaily interest rate data matching the opening and closing of
the Frankfurt and New York exchange were not available. Goodhart (1988)
interviewed numerous interbank foreign exchange traders. He found that an
`open position is seen generally as a pure currency play with little attention
normally being given to interest rates' (Goodhart 1988, p. 457). Estimation
results on daily data in Goodhart (1988) indicate that omitting from equation (1)
the variable capturing the change in the short-term interest differential will not
detract from its relevance. Goodhart concludes that interest rate changes, which
he assumes to be mainly unanticipated, `explain effectively none of the exchange
rate fluctuations' (Goodhart 1988, p.441). The same result emerges from
empirical investigations in Eijffinger and Gruijters (1992).
2. As of September 1987 the G-3 countries no longer seemed to be willing to direct
monetary policy at stabilizing exchange rates as was agreed upon at the Louvre
meeting. Furthermore, the October I987 stock market crash is likely to have
caught exchange market participants off balance, calling for dollar supporting
intervention.
In the first half of I988, the US dollar recovered gradually from i[s steep
decline in the aftermath of the stock market crash. The dollar's upward
movement against the mark strengthened vigorously from June 1988 through
September 1988. It appeared to be possible for the US economy to experience a
relatively strong growth without frustrating external adjustment. The
announcement of US trade deficits which were much smaller than expected made
exchange market participants to anticipate a further appreciation of the dollar.
Coordinated central bank interventions in August 1988 to counteract this rise
was supported by the Bundesbank's move, on August 25, to raise its discount
rate by 'á percentage point leading to a narrowing of the interest differential in
favor of the dollar.
From December 1988 to June 1989 political strains in Germany and Japan on
the one hand, and a widening short-term interest differential favouring the US
dollar over the deutsche mark on the other hand put the value of the dollar under
upward pressure. Thereby, the market temporarily overlooked the structural
weakness of the US dollar caused by the persistent US 'twin deficit'. The
buoyancy of the dollar and thus the perceived need for (US) inten~ention finally
subsided in late June 1989. Indications of a deceleration of economic growth and
a lessening of inflationary pressure led to market expectations of an easier US
monetary policy stance and lower short-term interest rates.
During the period August 1989-October 1989, again, the dollar came under
upward pressure. The currency was strengthened by lower than expected US
trade deficits for June and luly released on August I7 and September l5,18
respectively, and favorable employment and retail sales data lowering the
probability, as perceived by market participants, of an easing of US monetary
policy. By means of official sales of dollars, in part undertaken after a G-7
meeting on September 23, the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve tried to
convince market participants that the G-7 monetary authorities were firmly
committed to resisting the dollar's rise and maintaining exchange rate stability.
3. Loopesko (1984) found a high degree of contemporaneous correlation between
daily exchange rates and daily interventions.
4. The intervention reaction functions estimated in Almekinders and Ei;ffir.ger
(1994a,b) contains the conditional variance of day t's return in the DM~S-market
as an additional explanatory variable. Estimation resul[s tbr GARCH models of
daily exchange rate returns were used to generate time series for the conditional
variance. The referee of this Discussion Paper kindly pointed ou[ that, in the
present paper, such a two step procedure can lead to incorrect results. Such two
step-estimators sometimes lead to inconsistent point estima[es in the second-step
eyuation, and often to incorrect standard errors. More importantly, this may
invalidate the test procedure implemented in the next section of this paper,
which is based on normally and independently distributed errors.
5. Note that in Almekinders and Eijffinger (1994a,b) the term Q, (S,`' - S.~) was
omi[ted from the intervention reaction function to rule out a possibie simtiltaneity bias in
the estimation results.
6. Periods of prolonged interventions in one direction are selected to rule out the
possibility that `negative' desired interventions are simply observed interventions
in the opposite direction (i.e. selling instead of buying and vice ver.ra).
7. However, the ML estimation will only provide meaningful results when equa[ion
(6.5) and (6.6) are coherent, i.e. when they can be solved uniquely for INV, and
(S," - S,'), given (S,P - S,M'), E, and ~,.
8. If equation (lOj is a linear regression model, it corresponds to the usua! residual.
9. Gleske, a former executive director of the Deutsche Bundesbank responsible for
intervention operations states that `under certain circumstances, only small
interventions may suffice to curb or even reverse an unwanted movement in the
exchange rate. In other cases even large interventions may result in the opposite
effect; when market participants are convinced of the strength of an underlying
trend...' (Gleske 1982, p.265, our translation).Uiscussion Paper Scrics, CentER, Tilburg Universit}, The Netherlands:
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